The determinants of voting for pre-electoral coalitions were investigated in an experimental manner by Gschwend and Hooghe (2008) . The aim of that article was to investigate how voters decide whether or not to follow their initially preferred party into a pre-electoral coalition. This kind of question almost inevitably calls for experimental research, since at the election ballot voters only receive one opportunity to express their electoral preference. In this chapter, we will focus on the way an experimental design can be used to develop this kind of study. Before going into a number of (methodological) decisions that have been made when designing and implementing the experiment, we will briefly summarize the theoretical model underlying this research.
Pre-electoral coalitions
The formation of pre-electoral coalitions (PEC) is widespread. Golder (2005) lists a total of 134 elections in advanced industrial democracies, held between 1946 and 1998, in which at least one pre-electoral coalition participated. The formation of a pre-electoral coalition is found to be fostered by several institutional incentives (Golder, 2006) . A disproportional electoral system provides a strong incentive to political parties to join hands. Parties are also more likely to cooperate if the party system is ideologically polarized, when the expected governing coalition is large and when the potential coalition partner is of a similar size. Finally, a PEC is generally formed between ideologically compatible political parties (Golder, 2006; Allern and Aylott, 2009 ).
While there is some research available on why parties enter a preelectoral coalition, less is known about whether and when these coalitions are elec torally successful. It is possible that the coalition partners would have gained the same number of votes if they had contested the election independently. It is also possible that the coalition attracts fewer votes, as potential voters desert the coalition given that they feel that their interests are not sufficiently represented by the new coalition. Theoretical expectations on voters' behavior in case of the establishment of a PEC are scarce. In line with the logic put forward by Cox (1997: 272) it can be hypothesized that voters follow a seat-maximizing logic, and therefore, that they remain loyal to the initially preferred party. In addition, it can be assumed that most voters should be seen as cognitive misers with regard to politics, that they will not re-evaluate the new choice-set of options available to them and that they will remain loyal to the coalition. In sum, it is often assumed that voters will generally follow their preferred party into the pre-electoral coalition (Popkin, 1991) .
Nevertheless, Gschwend and Hooghe (2008) identify five conditions under which voters will be more likely to deviate from this baseline prediction. The first hypothesis states that if the ideological distance between the
